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Abstract—Due to the urgent and unpredictable nature of disas-
ter relief, emergency management systems (EMS) faces an enor-
mous challenge of real-time data analysis without the complete
information from emergency communication networks (ECNs).
In this letter, we propose an incomplete information based two-
tier game model (IITG) to realize collaborative computing at the
edge of ECNs, which incentivizes idle computing devices (ICDs)
to share computation resources through maximizing utilities
of EMS and ICDs. Furthermore, we develop a near-optimal
IITG algorithm (N-IITG) to seek the unique Bayesian Nash
equilibrium. Simulation results reveal that N-IITG outperforms
the existing incomplete information based methods in terms of
computation latency and participants utilities.
Index Terms—collaborative computing, game theory, incom-
plete information, emergency communication networks
I. INTRODUCTION
To reduce the harmful effects of unpredictable disasters,
the emergency management system (EMS) requires timely
analysis of the massive amount of data for providing effective
disaster relief strategies [1]. This stringent requirement brings
a significant challenge to real-time data computation in emer-
gency communication networks (ECNs). Moreover, due to the
highly uncertain nature of disasters, it is extremely difficult to
obtain complete information of ECNs in advance [2]. There-
fore, how to design an effective data processing mechanism
based on incomplete information becomes essential for ECNs.
To relieve the computation pressure in ECNs, some re-
searchers propose the collaborative computing at the edge of
networks, which utilizes the spare computational resources
from smartphones, desktop PCs, or other computational de-
vices in proximity to achieve a dynamic increase in com-
putational capacity [3], [4]. While the concept of collab-
orative computing is promising, engaging idle computing
devices (ICDs) for sharing could be difficult as they have
no commitments to do so. They may expect compensation
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since computation offloading potentially affects local comput-
ing tasks. Therefore, successful exploitation of collaborative
computing at the edge of ECNs requires a careful design of
the incentive mechanism. The game theory-based approach is
one of the suitable tools to model and analyze the incentive
mechanism [5]. Nevertheless, the existing mechanisms in the
literature have overlooked several critical issues. First, recent
literature is largely based on the assumption that the com-
petitive participants have the full knowledge of the network
and local constraints [6], [7], such as the path loss fading
and computation capacities. However, it is extremely difficult
to acquire such information of ECNs in advance in most
realistic scenarios. Furthermore, the self-interested participants
are non-cooperative in ECNs, and thus the competitions, in
this case, exist not only between the EMS (service consumer)
and the ICDs (service provider), but also among the ICDs.
Although the previous game-theoretic studies can cope with
the competition between the service provider and the service
consumer [6], [8], [9] or inside service providers [7], [10], few
consider the above competitive relationships simultaneously.
In this work, we propose an incomplete information based
two-tier game model (IITG) to incentivize collaborative com-
puting at the edge of ECNs, where the objective is to maximize
the utilities of the EMS and the ICDs through optimizing
the pricing strategy and the computing resources allocation
simultaneously. Specifically, the interactions between the EMS
and the ICDs are formulated as a two-tier game model, which
jointly combines the Stackelberg game and the Cournot game.
Through this model, the EMS can dynamically optimize its
pricing mechanism, and the ICDs can select the optimal
computation workload accordingly. Furthermore, depending
on what the EMS and the ICDs know, we seek the Bayesian
Nash equilibrium (BNE) under incomplete information, and a
near-optimal IITG (N-IITG) algorithm is developed to reach
the unique BNE by iterations. Simulation results demonstrate
that our design achieves a near-optimal performance of com-
plete information and outperforms the existing incomplete
information based methods in terms of computation latency
and participants utilities.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
We consider a collaborative computing scenario illustrated
in Fig. 1. There are I ICDs, denoted as I , {1, 2, . . . , I},
locating at the edge of ECNs to offer computational services
for the EMS. During a time slot, QEMS bits of data are
processed for emergency management, and we assume PEMS
as the unit profit that the EMS benefits from the data analysis.
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As a centralized datacenter, the EMS needs to determine the
optimal unit price popt (per bit) to incentivize collaborative
computing. Then, the optimal amount of computing resources
qopti is provided by each ICDi. Once the collaboration is set
up, the processed data will be transmitted back to the EMS for
emergency management, and each ICD gets its compensation
for sharing its computation resources.
ICD1
EMS
Cloud
p : Public Information
ci : Private Information
qi : Protect Information
ICDi ICDI
p
ci 
qi 
Fig. 1. Illustration of the collaborative computing architecture.
To incentivize the collaborative computing from the ICDs
and satisfy the computation requirement from the EMS, the
objective of this work is to jointly optimize the pricing strategy
popt and the computing resources allocation {qopti |i∈I} to
maximize the utilities of the EMS and the ICDs. We adopt
the payoff to each participant as its utility. The mathematical
model is described in detail as follows.
A. Utility Model
The utility of the EMS is defined as the profit through
computing offloading minus the sum of its payments to the
ICDs, which can be given by
UEMS(p) = (PEMS − p) min{QEMS, QICD}, (1)
where the unit profit PEMS benefiting from the data analysis
is a known parameter, which may vary with the importance of
the emergency management task. The price strategy p denotes
the unit price of computing offloading offered by the EMS.
The total amount of the shared computing resources paid by
the EMS is the minimum value of QEMS and QICD, where
QICD is the total amount of computing resources shared by the
ICDs. We assume rationality in this work that the EMS will
not buy the computing resources beyond its requirement, and
the ICDs will not share computing resources without benefit.
The utility Ui of ICDi is defined as the reward paid by the
EMS minus the cost to accomplish qi bits of data processing,
which can be expressed as
Ui(qi) = (p− ci)qi, (2)
where qi denotes the number of computing resources shared
by ICDi. The unit cost ci (per bit) for sharing denotes the
transmission energy and computing cost for offloading one bit
of data, which dynamically varies with CPU performance, path
loss fading, and other network environments [4].
B. Incomplete information model
Since ECNs have the characteristic of high uncertainty, it
is impractical to get complete information in advance during
collaborative computing. Similar to other incomplete infor-
mation scenarios [8]–[10], the EMS may know each ICD’s
characteristics or not, such as collaboration costs ci. Thus,
we develop an incomplete information model depending on
whether the information is known by others.
• Public Information: Known by all participants.
• Protect Information: Known by part of participants.
• Private Information: Only known by participant itself.
Then, we can classify the parameters in (1) and (2) into
three categories as listed in Table I.
TABLE I
THE INCOMPLETE INFORMATION MODEL
Information Category Parameter
Public Information p
Protect Information qi
Private Information QEMS, PEMS, ci
Considering the practical situation, we assume that the unit
price p is common knowledge of all participants, including the
EMS and the ICDs. The offloading strategy qi is the protect
information which can be obtained by the EMS and each ICD.
The private information ci is the actual unit cost known to
each ICD but is not known by EMS or other ICDs. Also, the
computing task parameters QEMS and PEMS are the private
information of the EMS.
By exploring (1) and (2), we notice that the EMS and
the ICDs have different objectives. The EMS expects the
ICDs to accomplish a more massive task with a lower unit
price, and the ICDs are the opposite. Meanwhile, each non-
cooperative ICD competes to acquire a higher payoff by
sharing a larger amount of computing resources; however, with
more computing resources supplied by ICD, the EMS can
damp down the unit price of computing offloading according
to the theory of demand and supply. Hence, the competitions
exist not only between the EMS and the ICDs but also among
multiple ICDs. This motivates us to propose an incomplete
information based two-tier game (IITG) model to tackle the
joint optimization problem of the EMS and the ICDs.
III. TWO-TIER GAME ANALYSIS UNDER INCOMPLETE
INFORMATION
In this section, we analyze the optimal strategies of the
EMS and the ICDs by jointing a Stackelberg game and a
Cournot game under incomplete information. The optimization
problems for the EMS and the ICDs are conducted by the
following two tiers. We use the derived results to prove the
existence of BNE.
• Tier I: Players: the EMS (a single leader); Strategy: the
unit price p; Utility: UEMS(p) given in (1).
• Tier II: Players: the ICDs (multiple competitive follow-
ers); Strategy: the shared computing resources {qi|i∈I};
Utility: {Ui(qi)|i∈I} given in (2).
We first model the interaction between the EMS and the
ICDs as a Stackelberg game, i.e., the pricing strategy p and
the amount of computation offloading qi. In our proposed
collaborative computing model, the EMS (a single leader)
has the first-mover advantage to imposes the optimal unit
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price popt of computation offloading for the ICDs. Then, the
ICDs (multiple followers) can divide the optimal amount of
computation offloading qopti by following the pricing strategy
announced by the EMS. Both the EMS and the ICDs aim to
obtain the optimal utilities by maximizing their payoff. These
characteristics align well with the Stackelberg game model.
The objective function of the EMS is
max
popt
UEMS(p|PEMS, QEMS, q)
s.t. 0 ≤ popt ≤ PEMS, (3)
where q = {q1, q2, . . . , qi, . . . , qI} represents the computation
offloading strategies of all ICDs. The derived optimal unit
price popt paid to the ICDs should be no more than the
unit profit PEMS that the EMS can benefit from computation
offloading; otherwise, the utility of the EMS will be negative.
Then, the ICDs, acting as multiple followers in the Stackel-
berg game, deduce their optimal shared computing resources
by following the pricing strategy announced by the EMS
(leader). Moreover, the internal competitions among multiple
ICDs are modeled as a Cournot game, which is one of the most
popular types of games used to model the interactions among
multiple strategic generators. Since each ICD’s payoff depends
not only on its own strategy but also on the decisions of its
rivals, the optimization problem for ICDi can be expressed as
max
qopti
Ui(qi|p, q−i),∀i ∈ I
s.t.
∑
i∈I
qopti ≤ QEMS, (4)
where q−i is the strategy set of the ICDs other than ICDi.∑
i∈I q
opt
i ≤ QEMS denotes that the total amount of compu-
tation offloading is no more than the EMS’s demand because
all participants in the game are rational and thus will not share
computing resources without benefit.
Furthermore, since the internal competition among multiple
ICDs fits the Cournot game model, and thus we estimate p
by the Cournot price function model to depict the competitive
relationship. The unit price p is a decreasing function with
respect to the total amount of computation offloading. It is
subject to ∂p∂QICD < 0, where QICD =
∑
i∈I qi. To simplify
the problem, we estimate p with a universal linear model as
in references [7], [10], i.e.,
p = max
{
0, pmax − α
∑
i∈I
qi
}
, (5)
where pmax is the price function intercept that denotes the
maximum unit price offered by the EMS, and α is a non-
negative coefficient that reflects the change trend of the unit
price and the total amount of shared computing resources, i.e.,
α = − ∂p∂QICD .
Next, we adopt backward induction [6], [8], [9] for IITG
analysis as follows.
A. Tier II: the optimal computing offloading strategy
In this tier, we optimize the computing offloading strategy
for each ICD given the EMS’s (leader) strategy.
Theorem 1. Each ICDi (follower) determines the optimal
amount of computation offloading qopti given the unit price
strategy p and α from the EMS (leader), given by
qopti =
p− ci
α
, (6)
where ci is the private information known by each ICD itself.
Proof: We substitute (5) into (2); thus, the utility of ICDi
can be given by
Ui(qi) = −αq2i +
pmax − α∑
k 6=i
q̂k − ci
 qi. (7)
Under incomplete information model, the rivals’ decision
{qk|k 6=i} is the protect information to ICDi, and thus each
ICD only can estimate the rivals’ decision as q̂k. From (7),
Ui is a continuous quadratic function of qi by assuming∑
k 6=i qˆk is fixed, and the second derivative of Ui with respect
to qi is ∂
2Ui
∂q2i
= −2α, where α > 0. As ∂2Ui
∂q2i
< 0, Ui
is a concave function of qi. Therefore, by setting the first
derivative equal to zero, the optimal output of ICDi satisfies
qopti = (pmax − ci − α
∑
k 6=i q̂
opt
k )
/
2α . As p is known, we
can substitute (5) into the above equation, and obtain qopti
expressed as (6). This finishes the proof of Theorem 1.
The next problem is to adjust the pricing strategy p to
maximize the utility of the EMS while guaranteeing its com-
putational demand.
B. Tier I: the optimal unit price strategy
Under incomplete information, the EMS has a rough esti-
mation on each ICDs’ cost information. We consider that the
unit cost of ICDi is a variable following certain distributions.
Let us denote ci,n as the unit cost of ICDi with probability
γi,n. The probability γi,n satisfies
∑
n∈Ni γi,n = 1, where
n ∈ Ni , {1, 2, . . . , Ni} indicates there are Ni kinds of
possible values for unit cost ci.
Theorem 2. Given the unit profit PEMS and the computing
workload QEMS, the EMS can determine the optimal price
strategy p(QICD) by the the estimation of the unit cost of the
ICDs, which can be given by
popt(QICD) =
(
I + 1
2
PEMS − I − 1
2I
∑
i∈I
En∈Ni [ci,n]
)
− IPEMS −
∑
i∈I En∈Ni [ci,n]
2QEMS
QICD,
(8)
where En∈Ni [ci,n] denotes the estimation of the unit cost of
ICDi and QICD =
∑
i∈I qi denotes the enhanced computa-
tional capacity for emergency management on demand.
Proof: From (6) indicated in Theorem 1., the optimal
amount of shared computing resources from ICDi satisfies
qopti,n = (p− ci,n)/α when its actual unit cost is ci,n. From the
perspective of the EMS, it can determine the optimal strategy
qopti = q
opt
i,n with the probability γi,n. Thus the expected
amount of shared computing resources can be expressed as
E[QICD] =
∑
i∈I
En∈Ni [q
opt
i,n ] =
∑
i∈I
∑
n∈Ni
p− ci,n
α
γi,n
=
Ip−∑i∈I∑n∈Ni ci,nγi,n
α
,
(9)
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where
∑
n∈Ni ci,nγi,n is the expected unit cost of ICDi, which
can be denoted as En∈Ni [ci,n].
Substituting (5) into (9), and the total expected
amount of shared computing resources is E[QICD] =(
Ipmax −
∑
i∈I En∈Ni [ci,n]
)/
α . The expected utility of the
EMS can be represented as (10) at the top of the next page
by substituting the above equation into (1).
When α is fixed, E [UEMS] is a continuous quadratic
function of pmax. Similar to the proof of Theorem 1., we
can obtain the optimal parameter poptmax by setting the first
derivative equal to zero as poptmax = (I + 1)PEMS/2 −
(I − 1)∑i∈I En∈Ni [ci,n]/2I .
From (10), we can obtain that E [UEMS] is a monotonically
decreasing function with respect to α. Substituting poptmax
back to E[QICD], and it can be rewritten as E[QICD] =
(IPEMS −
∑
i∈I En∈Ni [ci,n])
/
2α . To satisfy the computa-
tion requirement from the EMS, the optimal parameter αopt
can be determined by replacing E[QICD] with QEMS as
αopt =
(
IPEMS −
∑
i∈I En∈Ni [ci,n]
)/
2QEMS .
Finally, we substitute poptmax and α
opt into (5) and obtain the
optimal unit price expressed as (8). This finishes the proof of
Theorem 2.
In this way, the EMS and the ICDs can yield BNE
{popt, {qopti,n ; ci,n}n∈Ni,i∈I}. Since there are Ni kinds of pos-
sible values for ICDi, BNE is not unique. To address this
problem, we design the N-IITG algorithm to iteratively get
the unique near-optimal strategies of the EMS and the ICDs
based on the IITG model. Next, we provide the details of the
near-optimal algorithm.
C. N-IITG Algorithm
To address the uniqueness problem of incomplete informa-
tion, we propose the N-IITG algorithm to yield the unique
BNE of the EMS and the ICDs.
Algorithm 1 N-IITG Algorithm: Seeking the unique BNE
Input: QEMS, PEMS, {ci,n, γi,n}n∈Ni,i∈I , , T
Output: popt, {qopti |i∈I}
1: Initially, the EMS estimates of the unit cost by cˆi0 ⇐
En∈Ni [ci,n].
2: initialize t⇐ 1.
3: repeat
4: EMS obtains popt and αopt by (8).
5: for ICDi do
6: qopti ⇐ p
opt−ci,n
αopt by (6).
7: end for
8: update cˆit ⇐ popt − αoptqopti ,∀i ∈ I
9: set t⇐ t+ 1.
10: until t ≥ T or |cˆit − cˆit−1| ≤ ,∀i ∈ I
Different from the complete information scenario, the EMS
and the ICDs need to find out the unique optimal strategies
by iterations from Step 3 to Step 10. Under incomplete
information model, the EMS only has the estimation of the
unit cost of ICDi, and it initializes the estimated unit cost
cˆi in expectation and deduces the optimal unit price popt
by (8). Then, each ICD determines its particular optimal
strategy qopti by (6) based on the actual unit cost. In each
iteration, the EMS can update the estimated unit cost cˆi by
the observed actions qopti from the ICDs. Then, the EMS
and the ICDs recalculate their optimal strategies until the
unit cost of each ICD converges to a stable value, or the
number of iterations exceeds its maximum threshold. Finally,
all participants achieve the unique BNE where no one will alter
its strategy if the strategies of the others remain unchanged.
Next, we discuss the time complexity of the N-IITG algo-
rithm. As shown in Algorithm 1, the time complexity of unit
cost estimation is O[I]. All participants can determine their
strategies by the closed-form solution, i.e., O[1]. Therefore,
the overall time complexity is O[NI], where N is the iteration
count required to converge. This result demonstrates that the
N-IITG algorithm can be finished in polynomial time.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we present numerical results to evaluate the
performance of the N-IITG algorithm. Parameter settings are
given first. The EMS’s demand QEMS is set as to 50 MB
and PEMS to 20 per MB. We consider that there are 10 ICDs
in proximity having idle computing resources, i.e., I = 10.
The unit cost ci for sharing computing resources is private
information, i.e., each ICD knows well its actual unit cost
ci, while the EMS and the other ICDs only have a rough
estimation based on the probability distribution, and then ci is
estimated as cˆi = En∈Ni [ci,n].
Here, we take Bernoulli distribution for instance, and divide
the unit cost into two types for simplicity, i.e., ci , {cLi , cHi },
and the probability is Γi , {γLi , γHi }, where γLi + γHi = 1.
The low unit cost cLi denotes low local computing intensity
and transmission power, and cHi is the exact opposite case.
According to these settings, we assume that the unit cost ci is
uniformly and randomly distributed over [1,10] ($/MB).
According to Theorem 2., the EMS determines its optimal
unit price popt based on the estimation of the unit cost, i.e.,
popt(QICD) =
(
I + 1
2
PEMS − I − 1
2I
∑
i∈I
(
cLi γ
L
i + c
H
i γ
H
i
))
− IPEMS −
∑
i∈I
(
cLi γ
L
i + c
H
i γ
H
i
)
2QEMS
QICD.
(11)
Then, according to Theorem 1., ICDi determines its optimal
amount of shared computing resources qopti according its
actual unit cost, which can be given by
qopti =

qLi
opt
=
popt − cLi
α
, ci = c
L
i
qHi
opt
=
popt − cHi
α
, ci = c
H
i .
(12)
As shown in Fig. 2, we investigate the shared computing
resources of each ICD under incomplete information and
compare it with the complete information scenario. Here, the
result of complete information can be derived by ci instead of
cˆi. To analyze the difference of actual unit cost and estimated
unit cost, we only set c2, c5 and c8 as unknown parameters,
which should be estimated by the expectation. As illustrated
in Fig. 2 (a), the ICDs are willing to offload more workload
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E [UEMS(pmax, α)] = − I
α (I + 1)
2
[
pmax −
(
I + 1
2
PEMS − I − 1
2I
∑
i∈I
En∈Ni [ci,n]
)]2
+
1
4αI
(
IPEMS −
∑
i∈I
En∈Ni [ci,n]
)2
.
(10)
than the EMS’s prediction if actual unit cost is smaller than
estimated unit cost, which makes the participants unable to
reach equilibrium after one iteration. Next, we simulate the
convergence iterations with our proposed N-IITG algorithm.
The upper limit  is set as 10−2. From Fig. 2 (b), the
computing resources shared by each ICD converges to the
value under complete information, and the total amount of the
shared computing resources satisfy the EMS’s computation re-
quirement. This result indicates that the N-IITG algorithm can
achieve a near-optimal performance of complete information
under the condition of incomplete information.
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Fig. 2. Shared computing resources versus ci and cˆi.
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Fig. 3. Algorithm comparison versus computing workload.
In Fig. 3, we compare the performance of the N-IITG
algorithm with two algorithms in terms of the computation
latency and the participants’ utilities, i.e., incomplete informa-
tion based Stackelberg game algorithm (IISG) [9], and incom-
plete information based Cournot game algorithm (IICG) [10].
Considering that the unit cost is proportional to the square
of processing rate [4], we define the computation latency as
max{qi/sqrt(ci)|i∈I}. Fig. 3(a) and 3(b) demonstrate that our
proposed N-IITG algorithm can achieve a lower computation
latency and a higher average utility of ICDs under different
computing workloads1. Furthermore, apart from the utility, the
computation latency is also important to the performance of
the EMS in ECNs. Therefore, we compare the performance
of the EMS by the ratio of the above two items, and the N-
IITG algorithm outperforms the other two algorithms as well.
1Since IICG cannot dynamically adjust its pricing strategy, the computing
task fails to be processed when it increases to 400 MB or above. Therefore,
the computation latency of IICG is infinite, and the utilities are zero in Fig.3.
That is because our proposed N-IITG algorithm considers not
only the interaction between the EMS and the ICDs but also
the internal competitions among the ICDs. In this way, the
EMS can dynamically adapt its pricing strategy to inspire the
competitive ICDs for sharing sufficient computing resources,
which contributes to relieve the computation pressure in ECNs.
Each ICD involved in collaborative computing can maximize
its utility by selecting the optimal computation workload.
V. CONCLUSION
In this letter, we proposed an IITG model to incentivize
collaborative computing in ECNs, which jointly combined the
Stackelberg game and the Cournot game. Depending on the
given information of the EMS and the ICDs, we analyzed
BNE of the EMS and the ICDs under incomplete information,
and further designed the N-IITG algorithm that can iteratively
convergent to the unique BNE. According to the simulation
results, the proposed scheme achieved a significant increase
in computational capacity while each participant obtained
the optimal profit. For future work, it would be meaningful
to study the collaborative computing problem in ECNs by
combining cloud computing.
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